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Rob Boddice has provided an engaging exploration of three issues that were the 
source of much debate in the later Victorian period: vivisection, vaccination and 
eugenics. Boddice’s real focus, however, is on how scientific culture in the later part 
of the nineteenth century appropriated and deployed sympathy, a term the Victorians 
had inherited from the moral philosophers of the eighteenth century and put to work 
for their own ethical purposes. The driving argument of this study is that evolutionary 
theory — and especially the work of Charles Darwin — produced a radical and 
sometimes surprising re-configuring of what sympathy could mean and how it was 
manifested in policy and practice that was argued to benefit the social whole. This 
modified — or even transformed — notion of sympathy involved new elites, new 
locations and new procedures. It produced redrawn notions of gender and class 
behaviour and prompted radical reassessment of the relation between individual and 
state. Science, Boddice argues, is emotional, driven by its own ‘taboos, duties, and 
sins’. By ‘defamiliarizing sympathy’ in its nineteenth-century context, his book aims 
to make us ‘think critically about the meanings of sympathy and morality and the role 
of science and scientists in our own everyday lives’ (25).  
 Early chapters establish the ground. Discussion of Darwin’s argument, in 
Descent of Man, that sympathy is an instinct found in social animals and developed in 
human societies, pinpoints the complexity of the term, even within evolutionary 
debate. Sympathy is both instinct and habit, a feeling and an outcome of reason. 
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Boddice’s aim is to identify a ‘sympathy’ specific to this scientific world and to 
account for its peculiar contribution to changing notions of moral value in Victorian 
society and culture. The advance of physiology, germ theory and racial statistics was 
accompanied by arguments about their ethical power, creating at the same time a 
‘modern scientific self’ characterized as especially sympathetic. In Boddice’s 
argument, however, this ‘science of sympathy’ is esoteric, little understood outside 
the scientific community and, as a result, destined to dwindle with little lasting trace 
(11, 6). ‘As I cut, I do good’, is the morally-flavoured incantation Boddice ascribes to 
the vivisector as he established his practice as ethical. The problem that persists in this 
lively study is whether ‘sympathy’ is really what is at stake. If sympathy is divested 
of what it was generally understood to connote — namely some form of imaginative 
(or indeed corporeal) identification — can it still meaningfully be sympathy? Every 
now and then, the argument feels haunted by Humpy Dumpty insisting that ‘When I 
use a word […] it means just what I choose it to mean’.  
Nevertheless, Boddice is right that sympathy was much discussed by scientific 
men (and they were mainly men) and was importantly implicated in their debates. In 
relation especially to arguments about vivisection, it was opponents as much as 
advocates that kept sympathy in view. The anti-vivisection lobby in Britain was well 
organized, using the mainstream press alongside dedicated publications like the 
Zoophilist (the organ of the anti-vivisection Victoria Street Society). In writing about 
how sympathy was endangered by the sanctioned cutting of animals, they frequently 
foregrounded issues of gender — in part because of the prominence of women 
campaigners, like Frances Power Cobbe — and nationality. In a chapter on ‘Common 
Compassion and the Mad Scientist’ Boddice rehearses some of the well-known 
controversies that accompanied the expansion of physiology in continental Europe 
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which, with the publication of the Handbook for the Physiological Laboratory in 
1873, sparked a Royal Commission enquiry and subsequent legislation regulating the 
treatment of animals in physiological laboratories. National stereotypes abounded, 
contrasting continental callousness with an ideal of English decency and kindness, the 
latter imperilled by the forces of specialization, professionalization and cross-
continental dialogue. Germany, leading the way in experimentalism of all kinds, was 
especially dangerous, given to ‘unscientific carelessness’ likely to be ‘hurtful to the 
moral sense of England’ (55). Through anti-vivisection campaigning, the ‘mad-
scientist’ figure emerged as ‘morally stunted, emotionally cold, and a dangerous 
virtuoso of cruel arts’ (58). This is one of the few places where Boddice turns to 
literary culture, referencing the scientist figures haunting late-Victorian gothic fiction 
such as H.G. Wells’s Dr Moreau (60–62). It is the emotionally neutral scientist, 
professional and calm, that worried Cobbe most profoundly as he presided over sights 
and sounds that ought to raise howls of anguish. Cobbe was alert to the perils of 
desensitization: it is the necessary commonality of ‘common compassion’ that 
scientific culture threatened. 
One of the most interesting aspects of this book is its treatment of the spaces 
and locations central to this ‘science of sympathy’ — especially the experimental 
physiological laboratory. The chapter on vivisection focuses on these ‘theatres of 
emotional control’ (75). Its ‘rules, its ethos, its specialized detachment, its equipment, 
and its special arrangement of space’ were designed to bar sentimentalism while 
protecting a more profound emotional sensibility connected to end-goals (76). The lab 
was meant to de-sensationalize (rather than de-sensitize): specialization, repetition, 
routinization and tedium were crucial to its day-to-day activities, as were training and 
practice (79-80; 91). These modern spaces and procedures codified the practices of 
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professionals trained to ‘feel’ in a special way. Another, rather different but 
intriguing, issue that surfaces from time to time is how scientific practitioners 
‘navigated’ (the term derives from William Reddy’s The Navigation of Feeling) 
different modes of emotional response in very different spaces — between, for 
instance, laboratory, lecture room, home parlour and club (22). The book’s normally 
detailed and textured research is a little thinner here, though. This perhaps is a 
consequence of brilliantly illuminating work on the same material that has already 
been undertaken by the historian of science Paul White.
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 The book is slightly unbalanced in its topic treatment. Boddice has previously 
written extensively on attitudes towards animals and the vivisection debate is given 
substantial space. By contrast, Chapter 5, dealing with the vaccination controversies, 
runs only to 13 pages. Acknowledging that the history of compulsory medical 
intervention has had much attention, Boddice instead turns to a comparison of four 
prominent evolutionists (Darwin, Herbert Spencer, Thomas Henry Huxley and Alfred 
Russel Wallace) in order to chart their divergent positions (two are pro vaccination, 
for different reasons; and two are anti, again for different reasons). While Boddice 
helpfully identifies the diverse positions emerging from major disagreements about 
the moral implications of Darwinian evolution, the meaning of ‘sympathy’ again 
becomes attenuated in the process. The chapter title is ‘Sympathy, Liberty, and 
Compulsion’, and while the latter two terms seem prominent and obvious, sympathy 
struggles to stay in view even as a redefined term. At times it appears to mean 
something like ‘a moral stance that judges an individual’s responsibilities in terms of 
an agreed wider social good’. There have always been gestures that bracket off the 
moral implications of an action for the sake of a greater benefit, but that it is sympathy 
that remains prominent and in some real sense at play is harder to demonstrate.  
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 More successful is the final chapter on eugenics. Francis Galton’s promotion 
of eugenics as a ‘new religion’ is presented as an emotional process, an ‘evolution of 
the emotions’ required for the public good (121–122). There is a fascinating argument 
here that foregrounds Galton’s ‘emotional’ rhetoric about the ‘virile’, ‘hopeful’ and 
‘noble’ creed of eugenics. For Galton (as for other evolutionists) the moral quandary 
facing modern society is that ‘[c]ivilization contained the seeds of its own demise’, as 
moral imperatives work to check the ‘process of elimination’ that rids a society of the 
‘unfit’ (117). Sympathy as it functions in such societies is a kind of unintended 
consequence of the original social instinct. Darwin himself believed this was an 
inevitable bind: kindness towards the most vulnerable hampers and damages the 
process of natural selection, but to refuse such kindness risks an even more serious 
form of damage. Galton believed the quandary could only be tackled by men of 
special qualities — ‘men who deemed themselves more “fully evolved” than the 
mass’ (119). It is chilling to read Galton explaining to his protégé, Karl Pearson, that 
he felt sympathy with ‘those simple childlike natures’ who look for a ‘crutch’ ‘in the 
faiths of mankind’s infancy’, but adding: ‘It aids them, but it would be of no service 
to you and me’ (130). They are different, and eugenic policy — the practice of what 
Galton deemed ‘rational’ selection — had to be managed by an elite class of 
professional men. Boddice helpfully identifies the emotional undertow of a eugenic 
discourse that reifies reason.
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 This book is explicitly situated within the thriving disciplinary area of the 
history of emotions. Boddice’s methodology draws on some of its key figures and 
ideas, like William Reddy’s language of navigation and emotional regimes, and 
Thomas Haskell’s notion of a ‘recipe knowledge’ that sees new combinations of 
known elements extending limits for possible actions (14–15; 8–9). Prominent in 
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citations is work by younger scholars like Thomas Dixon, who heads the Centre for 
the History of Emotions at Queen Mary, University of London, and the historian of 
science Paul White. The Science of Sympathy is a welcome contribution to this still-
emerging body of scholarship that has brought real illumination to the scientific 
cultures of the nineteenth century in particular. But whether it really manages to 
identify and illuminate a distinctive new quality of sympathy is more in doubt. In his 
1913 work, The Nature of Sympathy, the German philosopher Max Scheler detailed 
four different divisions of the types of sympathizing; writing nearly a century later, in 
2009, the literary historian Jonathan Lamb detailed six distinct and discernible modes 
of sympathy at work in the eighteenth century.
3
 Sympathy was always diverse and 
difficult to pin down. The sentiment which often accompanied sympathizing in 
Victorian culture was, throughout the century, attacked by those who saw themselves 
equipped to see a greater good in its (invariably manly) control. Rather than finding a 
sympathy distinct from that ‘known, either before or since’, we might acknowledge 
that sympathy was a highly-overburdened concept and that the Victorian evolutionary 
science of the later nineteenth century played an important part in ending its moral 
centrality. 
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